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Abstract
Linkages between Emissions Trading Systems are deemed an important element of the 
future climate policy landscape. They are, however, diﬃcult to agree and remain few 
and far between. Temporary restrictions on permit trading have potential to facilitate and 
gradually approach unrestricted, full linkage. We compare the relative merits of several 
link restrictions in this respect, namely quantitative transfer limits, border taxes on trans-
fers, exchange and discount rates, and unilateral linkage. To this end, we develop a simple 
model to have a unifying framework which, in conjunction with lessons we draw from real-
world experiences, serves as a basis for a broader, policy-oriented discussion. While quan-
titative restrictions seem to be the natural route to full linkage, they can lead to uncertain 
distributional eﬀects and weaken price signals. These aspects are mitigated under a border 
permit tax, but this policy seems harder to implement. Exchange rates have potential to 
adjust for programmes’ stringencies and raise ambition over time, but can be challenging to 
select. As experience corroborates, unilateral linkage can be a convenient approach.
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1 Introduction
Linkages between Emissions Trading Systems (ETSs) are deemed a key element of the 
future climate policy landscape (Bodansky et al. 2016; Mehling et al. 2018).1 Indeed, for 
many parties to the Paris Agreement, one of the instruments of choice to deliver on the 
pledged emissions reductions is carbon markets, 21 of which are in operation along with 
others in the pipeline (ICAP 2018). Against this backdrop, linkage has become high on 
the climate policy agenda because it has potential to unleash cost-eﬃciency gains and help 
ratchet up ambition. Although most jurisdictions with operating or planned ETSs have 
engaged in some form of linking negotiations, links are diﬃcult to agree and remain few 
and far between.
Indeed, the multi-faceted nature of linkage as well as growing heterogeneity in market 
designs and governance frameworks pose many challenges to prospective partners (Ranson 
and Stavins 2016). First, discrepancies in autarky prices reﬂect diﬀerent ambition levels or 
views about the desirable price signal (Fankhauser and Hepburn 2010).2 Although a wide 
autarky price gap would increase attendant economic linkage gains, this may also raise 
concerns about rent transfer, equity, exported abatement co-beneﬁts and so on, thereby 
impeding on the political feasibility of a link. Second, a certain degree of design harmo-
nization is required to ensure market compatibility and avoid disruptions to the linked sys-
tem, which also reduces regulatory autonomy (Jaﬀe et al. 2009).3 Third, even when juris-
dictions have compatible systems and are seeing eye to eye in terms of ambition, there are 
still risks that link outcomes do not unfold as anticipated. For instance, linkage creates 
exposure to ‘imported risks’, i.e., developments originating abroad that propagate through-
out the linked system (Flachsland et al. 2009).
Therefore, forging linkage agreements that reconcile and accommodate every party’s 
interests is proving diﬃcult and the most suitable way for interconnection may well fall 
short of a full, unrestricted link, at least in the near term. Two types of approaches can be 
contemplated to palliate the acknowledged diﬃculties in initiating linkage. First, interties 
through a common hub might constitute a ﬁrst step toward further market integration, 
e.g. networking or indirect linkage via oﬀsetting.4 For instance, Jaﬀe et al. (2009), Tuerk 
et al. (2009) and Fankhauser and Hepburn (2010) conceived of a progressive mechanism 
of market integration via unilateral connections to the Clean Development Mechanism, 
2 Explicit carbon prices are undoubtedly excessively narrow measures of mitigation eﬀorts and as such 
cannot constitute an appropriate metric to compare eﬀort across jurisdictions, see Aldy and Pizer (2016) 
and Aldy et al. (2017) for a detailed discussion. As market signals that drive private-sector behavior and 
long-term investment decisions, however, regulators can hold their own views about what price level is 
desirable.
3 Market designs and caps reﬂect jurisdictional circumstances and have often been critical to striking an 
internal political deal (Flachsland et al. 2009). This complicates inter-system design alignment as one may 
be limited in its inclination to cede sovereign control over entrenched policy objectives and design features.
4 The concept of networking has recently emerged as a substitute for direct multilateral linkages (Füssler 
et al. 2016; Keohane et al. 2017). The idea is to allow for trades of ‘carbon assets’ between systems that are 
inherently diﬀerent (e.g., in terms of design, ambition, MRV standards) by placing a ‘mitigation value’ on 
such assets that account for these diﬀerences and possibly using trade restrictions as analyzed here.
1 Broadly speaking, linkage refers to connections between separate jurisdictional climate policies allowing 
for abatement eﬀorts to be redistributed across jurisdictions in a way that diminishes the aggregate costs of 
achieving the overall target. Linkage is deﬁned herein in its typical frame, i.e., between two ETSs, but link-
age among heterogeneous policies may be feasible (Metcalf and Weisbach 2012; Mehling et al. 2017).
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envisaged as a common hub in the Kyoto era.5 Second, permit trade restrictions might be 
established in the perspective of full linkage. According to Mehling and Haites (2009), «a 
bilateral link can be approached gradually; quantity restrictions could be applied to the 
other scheme’s units initially and can be loosened over time as the eﬀects [associated with 
the link] become clear».
In essence, restrictions provide levers to adjust for the reach of the link and their poten-
tial is threefold. First, they can contain some link-induced eﬀects (e.g., price variation or 
abatement relocation) that otherwise stymie link formation (Jaﬀe et  al. 2009; Schneider 
et al. 2017).6 Second, they can provide leverage in linkage negotiations through induced 
rents or revenues (Gavard et al. 2016). Third but not least, they can help gradually over-
come some obstacles to full linkage while giving a taste of it, essentially facilitating nego-
tiations by breaking down a lengthy linking process into progressive steps in the sense of 
‘linking by degrees’ (Burtraw et al. 2013).7 Our focus primarily lies on the latter aspect. 
Indeed, such a gradual approach and the various forms it may take have not yet been ana-
lyzed carefully.
We consider three main types of link restrictions, namely quantitative transfer limits, 
border taxes on permit transfers and exchange rates on permits’ compliance values. We 
also discuss two other forms of restrictions, namely unilateral linkage and discount rates. 
To evaluate their relative eﬀects we use a partial-equilibrium model of linkage between two 
markets in a static and deterministic framework. Our stylized model is simple which oﬀers 
analytical tractability and, crucially, enables us to compare all types of link restrictions in 
a unifying framework.8 This greatly enhances insight and constitutes our ﬁrst contribution.
No less importantly, our model has enough structure to highlight key diﬀerences across 
restrictions. In particular, we adopt a descriptive approach in comparing their relative 
implications in terms of cost eﬃciency, location and volume of abatement, price formation 
and inter-jurisdictional distributional aspects. By design, therefore, we lack a normative 
criterion for establishing a clear ranking between them.9 However, we take our modelling 
results, along with lessons we draw from real-world experiences with emissions trading 
and linkage, as a basis for a policy-oriented discussion of the comparative merits of each 
restriction—thereby oﬀering a policy menu, as it were—especially in their ability to initi-
ate linkage and gradually scale up the link. This is our second contribution.
Restrictions are distortionary and drive a wedge between jurisdictional prices relative 
to a full link.10 Hence, they create a trade-oﬀ between eliminating some impediments to 
5 Such an international oﬀsetting scheme is currently missing. The Sustainable Development Mechanism 
established under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement could allow for indirect links, but has yet to be devel-
oped.
6 As further discussed in Jaﬀe et al. (2009), restrictions can be employed «to reduce inter-system trading, or 
if there is a desire, to require that trading with other systems lead to a net reduction in emissions».
7 Symmetrically, link restrictions may provide levers to maneuver if partners are not satisﬁed with the link 
and wish it be severed. That is, they oﬀer alternative ways for the termination of a link, whose organization 
aﬀects inter-temporal cost eﬀectiveness and price formation (Pizer and Yates 2015).
8 Throughout the paper, we discuss how some of our results would fare under less restrictive assumptions.
9 Given the multi-faceted nature of linkage, there is a multitude of factors—often of a political-economy 
dimension—that may inﬂuence the desirable type and level of a restriction. Because this falls well beyond 
the scope of our model we take restrictions as exogenously given. That said, we provide examples of why 
restrictions may arise in practice based on general-equilibrium eﬀects or political-economy considerations 
throughout the paper and especially in the policy discussion in Sect. 4.
10 Restrictions are always detrimental w.r.t. full linkage in aggregate economic terms but they can improve 
upon full linkage from the point of view of a jurisdiction, whose optimal restriction level we characterize.
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linkage and undermining a fundamental reason for linking in the ﬁrst place, i.e., cost eﬃ-
ciency. More precisely, by ﬁxing the maximum authorized net permit transfer, a quantita-
tive restriction provides a direct quantity handle on the reach of the link but the ratio of 
inter-system price convergence is unknown ex ante. Symmetrically, a border tax sets the 
price ratio but there is uncertainty about the resulting permit transfers. In both cases, the 
restricted link outcomes are comprised between autarky and full linkage, and aggregate 
emissions are constant. Just like a border tax, an exchange rate speciﬁes the ratio of juris-
dictional marginal abatement costs in equilibrium but further alters the relative compliance 
value of permits. Aggregate emissions are thus allowed to vary as a result of inter-system 
permit trading.
On the face of it, quantitative restrictions seem to be the natural route to full linkage 
between two quantity instruments. However, under a binding quantitative restriction two 
distinct jurisdictional prices coexist and inter-system transaction prices may not reﬂect 
marginal abatement costs, which can generate uncertainty about price formation and unde-
sirable price ﬂuctuations. The binding restriction also generates a scarcity rent whose dis-
tribution across jurisdictions is not clear ex ante. Quantitative restrictions can thus lead to 
uncertain distributional eﬀects and weakened price signals, which may impair the transi-
tion to a full link.
Some of these aspects can be mitigated under a border tax on permits. First, since the 
price ratio is ﬁxed by the tax rate, there should be less undesirable price ﬂuctuations and 
transaction prices should convey better information on marginal abatement costs. Second, 
where a quantitative limit creates a rent whose inter-jurisdictional distribution is uncertain, 
a tax raises revenues collected by a given jurisdiction. Some distributional aspects of the 
link can thus be better managed and tax revenues can be seen as a form of inter-jurisdic-
tional transfers which might help spur cooperation. Border taxes, however, may be more 
complicated to implement and pursue legislatively speaking, for instance at the EU level.
By altering the fungibility of jurisdictional abatement eﬀorts, exchange rates can be 
employed to adjust for diﬀerences in programmes’ stringencies—and potentially other eco-
nomic as well as non-economic criteria. In addition, we show how exchange rates, when 
skillfully selected, have potential to increase ambition over time. On the ﬂip side, however, 
diﬃculties precisely pertain to the selection and subsequent adjustment of the exchange 
rate, which might possibly lead to environmental and economic outcomes worse than 
autarky.
Therefore, this analysis allows us to pinpoint comparative advantages and weaknesses 
for each restriction. Although there is no ‘ideal’ transitional restricted linkage, we ﬁnally 
show how experience suggests that unilateral linkage—whereby permits can ﬂow in one 
direction but not vice versa—can be a practical way of gradually approaching a full, two-
way link.11
By comparing all types of restrictions in a unifying framework, we complement and 
provide an analytical underpinning to Schneider et  al. (2017). Closer to our model, but 
conceptually diﬀerent, Rehdanz and Tol (2005) and Eyckmans and Kverndokk (2010) con-
sider trade restrictions as an expedient for importing jurisdictions to deter exporting juris-
dictions from issuing additional permits relative to autarky—a perverse eﬀect occurring 
11 Though a one-way link can be observationally equivalent to a two-way link, it may suddenly revert to 
autarky as some cost or abatement uncertainty is resolved.
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when inter-jurisdictional permit trading in the future is anticipated as ﬁrst shown by Helm 
(2003).12
The rest of the related literature largely resorts to CGE-based simulations. For instance, 
Bernstein et al. (1999), Bollen et al. (1999) and Criqui et al. (1999) compared the economic 
consequences of diﬀerent emissions trading scenarios to understand the opportunity cost of 
quantitative restrictions under the Kyoto Protocol.13 In particular, Ellerman and Sue Wing 
(2000) demonstrated the monopsonistic eﬀects and rents induced by restrictions on permit 
imports. More recently, trade restrictions gained renewed attention in the context of linking 
and networking. For instance, Burtraw et al. (2017) quantify the impacts of a link between 
the California ETS and RGGI with a 3-for-1 exchange rate in comparison with full linkage 
(1-for-1 trading) and Gavard et al. (2016) appraise the beneﬁts of a quantity-restricted link 
between China and the US (or Europe).14
In practice, restrictions have been used to regulate oﬀset credits for ‘supplementarity’ 
reasons in the form of both quantitative and qualitative limits on compliance usage and 
discount rates on compliance value (Trotignon 2012; Braun et  al. 2015; Gronwald and 
Hintermann 2016).15 To the best of our knowledge, the closest example of border taxes 
on inter-jurisdictional abatement transfers was on exports of Chinese Certiﬁed Emission 
Reductions, whose purported objective was to split the CDM rent between the government 
and projects owners (Liu 2010; Zhu 2014). The distortionary eﬀects, tax incidence and 
revenue potential of the CDM levy were also analyzed by Fankhauser and Martin (2010). 
So far, exchange rates have not been used to regulate uniformly-mixed pollutants but are 
contemplated in the context of networking. Usually they are advocated for non-uniformly 
mixed pollutants to account for the heterogeneity in both pollutants and reception points, 
and were for instance considered in the ozone-targeting RECLAIM programme (Tieten-
berg 1995; Johnson and Pekelney 1996).16 Finally, linkage has sometimes been initiated 
via restrictions, as attest transitional one-way links integrating Norway and the European 
aviation sector to the EU ETS.
The remainder proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets forth the unifying modelling frame-
work. Section 3 describes the implications of each link restriction analytically. Section 4 
provides a policy discussion on the relative merits of each restriction with a special focus 
on the transition to full linkage. Section 5 concludes. An Appendix contains the analytical 
12 Linkage may thus lead to increased overall emissions relative to autarky and thereby not be welfare-
enhancing for all parties (Carbone et al. 2009; Holtsmark and Sommervoll 2012).
13 These studies show that greater ﬂexibility reduces overall costs of compliance with the Protocol but that 
limited ﬂexibility can be preferable for some parties due to the induced rents they are able to capture. See 
also Westskog (2002) who discusses the relevance of various arguments for trading restrictions in this con-
text.
14 Gavard et  al. (2016) highlight an advantageous general-equilibrium eﬀect from the quantitative limit 
relative to full linkage. In addition to the captured rent China also beneﬁts from a limited consumption loss 
(due to a link-induced rise in permit and thus electricity prices) that otherwise swamps the gains from sell-
ing permits.
15 In general, quantitative limits do not exceed 15% of entities’ compliance obligations and, since oﬀset 
quotas usually span several compliance periods, oﬀset usage need also be timed. To give but one example 
of discount rate, France applies a 10% discount on the mitigation value of Emission Reduction Units.
16 In this case, volume eﬃciency requires that trading ratios be set equal to the ratio of delivery coeﬃcients 
so that marginal abatement costs vary across emission sources in accordance with associated marginal dam-
ages (Montgomery 1972; Mendelsohn 1986) although cost eﬃciency can generally not be achieved (Før-
sund and Nævdal 1998).
 S. Quemin, C. de Perthuis 
1 3
derivations and proofs (A), numerical simulations (B) and endogenizes domestic cap selec-
tion (C).
2  Modelling framework
There are two jurisdictions 1 and 2 with domestic ETSs in place to regulate uniformly-
mixed pollution.17 Permits markets are competitive and we abstract from market designs to 
single out restriction-speciﬁc eﬀects.18 We let e
i
 denote jurisdiction i’s emission level for 
i ∈ {1, 2} . For clarity and without loss of generality, jurisdictions have the same unregu-
lated emission level e
0
 and binding cap on emissions 휔 < e
0
.19 They thus face the domestic 
abatement target a = e
0
− 휔 > 0 . For comparability, we assume caps are enforced under 
autarky, full linkage and all other forms of restricted linkages. As we make clear below, it 
does not matter how permits are handed out for the purpose of our analysis.
We consider a representative ﬁrm in each jurisdiction, i.e. the aggregate of all ﬁrms 
located within its geographical boundaries (Montgomery 1972; Krupnick et  al. 1983). 
Abatement costs C
i
 in jurisdiction i are increasing and convex in the abatement level 
a
i
= e
0
− e
i
≥ 0 with C
i
(0) = 0 . For analytical tractability and as is standard practice, these 
functions are equipped with a quadratic speciﬁcation (Newell and Stavins 2003). Without 
loss of generality and up to a translation of the results the linear term is omitted for con-
venience and we let c
i
 denote jurisdiction i’s linear marginal abatement cost slope. That is, 
the higher c
i
 the less sensitive (i.e., elastic) i’s emissions ( de
i
 ) to a shift in the permit price 
( d휏 ) since d휏 = c
i
de
i
 . In other words, jurisdictions are identical but for abatement technol-
ogy and 1∕c
i
 measures jurisdiction i’s ﬂexibility in abatement.
Autarky Compliance cost minimization under autarky in jurisdiction i requires
Because abatement is costly, jurisdictions emit up to their binding caps and 휏
i
= c
i
a 
denotes i’s autarky permit price. When autarky prices diﬀer across jurisdictions, cost eﬃ-
ciency can be improved upon by relocating some abatement from the high-price to the 
low-price system. Let jurisdiction 1 (resp. 2) be the high-price (resp. low-price) system, 
i.e., 휏
1
> 휏
2
 . Therefore, jurisdiction 1 has less ﬂexibility in abatement than jurisdiction 2, 
i.e., 1∕c
1
< 1∕c
2
 and the natural direction of the net inter-jurisdictional permit ﬂow is from 
2 to 1.
Full linkage Jurisdictional permits are fungible, i.e. mutually recognized as valid com-
pliance instruments in either jurisdiction, and can ﬂow both ways without limitation. 
Abatement thus occurs where it is least expensive. At the full-linkage equilibrium joint 
compliance costs with the overall emissions cap 2휔 are minimized, that is
(1)mine
i
∈(0;e0)
⟨C
i
(e0 − ei)⟩ subject to ei ≤ 휔.
17 We limit the analysis to a bilateral link for ease of exposition but we note this is not entirely innocuous. 
For instance, in a multilateral linkage, permit importers may beneﬁt from binding quantitative restrictions 
on imports in other jurisdictions/sectors as this contains the permit price increase relative to a full link but 
not their own demands.
18 Price containment mechanisms aﬀect price formation (Holt and Shobe 2016) and full price convergence 
need not obtain when they are divergent across systems (Jaﬀe et al. 2009; Grüll and Taschini 2012).
19 We consider cap selection formally in “Appendix 3”. As discussed in Sect. 1, we take cap setting (just as 
the decision to link) as a decision of a political-economy nature. Without loss of generality, we thus place it 
beyond the scope of this work and take caps as given.
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We let Δ∗ > 0 denote the equilibrium variation in emissions in jurisdiction 1 as a result 
of full linkage relative to autarky. As the linked market clears, the full-link equilibrium is 
entirely characterized by
where 휏∗ is the full-link equilibrium price. With quadratic abatement costs it comes
where 1∕c = 1∕c
1
+ 1∕c
2
 denotes the ﬂexibility in abatement of the linked system. Overall 
abatement is the same as under autarky but is now apportioned across jurisdictions in pro-
portion to their ﬂexibility in abatement, i.e., jurisdiction i abates 휏∗∕c
i
 in equilibrium. That 
is, cost eﬃciency obtains and the autarky price diﬀerential is arbitraged away. The situation 
is graphically depicted in Fig.  1 where the thick-edged triangles demarcate the jurisdic-
tional eﬃciency gains from the full link, Γ∗
i
= c
i
Δ∗2∕2 = (휏
i
− 휏∗)2∕(2c
i
).20 Note that they 
are proportional to the square of the autarky-linking price wedges and that aggregate eﬃ-
ciency gains are distributed in inverse proportion to ﬂexibility, i.e., Γ∗
1
∕Γ∗
2
= c
1
∕c
2
.
Jurisdictional gains Our focus lies on eﬃciency and inter- (but not intra-) jurisdictional 
distributional aspects of linkage. That is, we treat each jurisdiction as a monolithic entity 
comprising the regulatory authority and the ﬁrms, which are themselves further aggregated 
into a representative ﬁrm. In the following when we refer to jurisdictional gains, we thus 
implicitly refer to the net combination of eﬃciency gains from linkage accruing to ﬁrms 
and the asset value created by carbon pricing (i.e., the monetary value of freely-allocated 
permits for ﬁrms and auction proceeds for the regulator). This simple structure will prove 
suﬃcient for salient divergences between link restrictions to emerge although we acknowl-
edge that intra-jurisdictional distributional aspects can be key in assessing the relative 
political-economy implications of link restrictions.21
In this context, note also that the permit allocation method is irrelevant as it inﬂuences 
intra-jurisdictional gains from linkage but not the net jurisdictional gains. Consider juris-
diction 1 for instance. As a result of the link, if permits are auctioned, ﬁrms would save 
(휏
1
− 휏∗)휔 in purchasing permits at auctions which would exactly oﬀset the loss in pro-
ceeds for the regulator. In turn, the net jurisdictional gains amount to the eﬃciency gains 
Γ
∗
1
 just as with free allocation. More speciﬁcally, with free allocation linkage is always ben-
eﬁcial on net for the representative ﬁrm but we cannot distinguish between ‘winning’ and 
‘losing’ ﬁrms within jurisdiction 1—here, for instance, selling (resp. buying) ﬁrms that are 
worse (resp. better) oﬀ from the link-induced price decrease.22
(2)
min
(e1 ,e2)∈(0;e0)
2
⟨C1(e0 − e1) + C2(e0 − e2)⟩ subject to e1 + e2 ≤ 2휔.
(3)C
′
1
(a − Δ∗) = 휏∗ = C′
2
(a + Δ∗),
(4)Δ
∗
=
휏1 − 휏2
c1 + c2
=
휏1 − 휏
∗
c1
=
휏
∗ − 휏2
c2
and 휏∗ = 2ca,
21 We leave this approach for future work as further outlined in Conclusion.
22 Because gains accrue infra-marginally to constituent ﬁrms the total gains, on a constituent basis, can be 
larger than the net gains accruing to the representative ﬁrm.
20 Even when autarky prices are equal and there are no ‘immediate’ eﬃciency gains, linkage still brings 
about beneﬁts in terms of increased market liquidity (as a thicker market ought to reduce bid-ask spreads) 
and risk sharing (Doda et al. 2018).
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3  Relative Implications of Link Restrictions
3.1  Linkage with Quantitative Limits on Permit Transfers
Consider that jurisdiction 1 limits net imports of permits for compliance or alternatively, 
that jurisdiction 2 imposes a limit on the net quantity of permits it is willing to export. 
Either way, we assume the restriction to be binding and let 훼 ∈ [0;1] denote the allowed 
share of the cost-eﬃcient, unrestricted transfer.23 Abatement transfer is thus restricted to 
Δ̄(훼) = 훼Δ∗ and the level of abatement undertaken by jurisdiction 1 (resp. 2) is a − Δ̄(훼) 
(resp. a + Δ̄(훼) ). On the face of it, a quantitative restriction should thus limit the reach of 
the link and associated impacts, i.e. its implications should be comprised between autarky 
and full linkage. As it turns out, there are more subtle implications.
The convergence in jurisdictional shadow prices is incomplete and cost eﬃciency does 
not obtain. The restriction 훼 ∈ (0;1) drives a wedge between these two prices denoted 
휏̄
1
(훼) = c
1
(a − Δ̄(훼)) and 휏̄
2
(훼) = c
2
(a + Δ̄(훼)) such that 휏
1
> 휏̄
1
(훼) > 휏∗ > 휏̄
2
(훼) > 휏
2
 . 
This generates a deadweight loss L(훼) ∝ (1 − 훼)2 that is the sum of the deadweight losses 
on the importer and exporter’s sides of the market (triangles L
1
 and L
2
 in Fig. 2), the mag-
nitude of which depends on jurisdictional abatement ﬂexibilities. Speciﬁcally, because 
overall abatement is maintained, cost eﬃciency relative to full linkage can be measured by 
the index
Even a stringent limit can bring about a high share of the full-link gains: I(10%) = 19% 
and I(50%) = 75% . The less stringent the restriction, the bigger the overall eﬃciency gain 
from the restricted link, but the lower the increase in gain at the margin. This is so because 
when 훼 increases, inter-jurisdictional price disparities narrow down and net gains per per-
mit exchanged decrease accordingly. In turn, the eﬃciency gains accruing to jurisdiction i 
reduces to Γ̄
i
(훼) = 훼2Γ∗
i
.
There are two crucial implications of the inter-jurisdictional price wedge. First, jurisdic-
tion 1 is willing to buy up 2-permits for a price of 휏̄
1
 at most while jurisdiction 2 is will-
ing to sell oﬀ 2-permits for a price of 휏̄
2
 at least. This implies that transaction prices are 
undetermined in the present model (they can settle anywhere in [휏̄2; 휏̄1] ) and that jurisdic-
tional permits are not entirely fungible commodities.24 Second, there exists a scarcity rent 
S(훼) ∝ 훼(1 − 훼) of size f + g in Fig. 2 whose apportionment between the two representa-
tive ﬁrms ultimately depends on these transaction prices.25 Note that the scarcity rent is at 
its highest when 훼 = 1∕2 and exceeds the joint eﬃciency gains Γ̄
1
+ Γ̄
2
 when 훼 ≤ 2∕3.
To pin down both the rent extraction and transaction prices we must specify something 
about bargaining. The market structure we consider is a bilateral monopoly and we assume 
a Nash bargaining game for the rent extraction (Nash 1950) with zero-value outside options 
(5)I(훼) = (Γ
∗
1
+ Γ∗
2
− L(훼))∕(Γ∗
1
+ Γ∗
2
) = 훼(2 − 훼).
23 In reality, quantitative restrictions are likely to be expressed in the form of concrete ceilings on the share 
of domestic caps that can be outsourced or exported. In practice, these restrictions could be implemented 
in a fashion akin to the ‘gateway mechanism’ proposed by Sterk et al. (2006) or by creating an additional 
market for licenses which must be attached to permits to allow for imports/exports as e.g., in Bernstein et al. 
(1999) or Gavard et al. (2016). Here, our notation clariﬁes exposition because the continuum of quantity-
constrained link equilibria between autarky and full linkage is described when 훼 spans [0; 1].
24 We note that this could reduce the gains in liquidity as compared to unrestricted linkage.
25 We underline that the scarcity rent results from the binding quantitative restriction and is independent of 
how permits are distributed in both jurisdictions in the ﬁrst place.
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where 휃 ∈ [0;1] (resp. 1 − 휃 ) denotes the bargaining power of jurisdiction 1 (resp. 2).26 In 
this case jurisdictions capture a share of the rent that is proportional to their respective bar-
gaining power
which also determines the permit transaction price
By contrast, the literature considers that the rent splitting ultimately depends on the way the 
restriction is set. For instance, Ellerman and Sue Wing (2000) consider the case of a com-
petitive permit supply on the linked market with restricted demand and Forner and Jotzo 
(2002) that of a competitive demand with restricted supply. Typically, it is assumed that a 
restriction on imports, i.e., on demand for 2-permits in jurisdiction 1, grants monopsony 
power ( 휃 = 1 ) to jurisdiction 1 which captures the entire rent. Symmetrically, a restriction 
on exports, i.e., on supply of 2-permits for jurisdiction 1, grants monopoly power ( 휃 = 0 ) 
to jurisdiction 2 which pockets the entire rent. There is, however, no reason to postulate the 
existence of a link between the deﬁnition of the restriction and the market structure itself.27
It is noteworthy that one jurisdiction may be better oﬀ from the restricted link relative 
to full linkage. To see this, ﬁx 휃 = 1 , i.e., jurisdiction 1 is monopsonistic and makes the 
transaction price. We reason around the full-link equilibrium to analyze the eﬀects of a 
binding restriction on jurisdictions’ total compliance costs, denoted TC
i
 in jurisdiction i. 
A restriction that is binding by a slightly enough margin leads to an inﬁnitesimally small 
increase in abatement in jurisdiction 1 ( d휀 > 0 ) and decrease in the price ( d휏 < 0 ). Any 
such active restriction changes the total costs of compliance in both jurisdictions. In par-
ticular for jurisdiction 1,
(6)S1(훼; 휃) = 휃S(훼), and S2(훼; 휃) = (1 − 휃)S(훼),
(7)휏̄(훼; 휃) = (1 − 휃)휏̄1(훼) + 휃휏̄2(훼).
Fig. 1  Autarky and full-linkage 
equilibria. Baselines ( e
0
 ) and 
domestic caps ( 휔 ) are common 
to both jurisdictions. c
i
 and 휏
i
 
denote jurisdiction i’s marginal 
abatement cost slope and autarky 
permit price. Δ∗ and 휏∗ denote 
the full-link equilibrium transfer 
volume and permit price. c is the 
marginal abatement cost slope 
of the linked market. Area Γ∗
i
 
demarcates the eﬃciency gains 
accruing to jurisdiction i under 
unrestricted permit trading
26 Following the seminal contribution by Hahn (1984) the literature generally focuses on the potential exer-
cise of market power in view of permit price manipulation in relation with the initial allocation of permits. 
An exception is Ellerman and Sue Wing (2000).
27 For instance, when demand is restricted, the standard argument is that the linked market is a pure buyers’ 
market (buyers’ cartel) in which acquiescent sellers are compelled to compete to sell oﬀ their permits (and 
vice versa for a restricted supply). But one could as well conceive of the situation where sellers collude and/
or buyers compete so that the model is underspeciﬁed without further assumptions on bargaining.
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The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (8) is positive and corresponds to the incremen-
tal increase in domestic abatement costs due to more expensive domestic abatement being 
substituted for imported permits. The second term is negative and measures the incremen-
tal cost savings on remaining imports. The sign of dTC
1
 is thus ambiguous and depends on 
the relative magnitude of these two countervailing eﬀects. When the restriction is lax (i.e., 
훼 close to 1), the import price eﬀect dominates the domestic abatement eﬀect and juris-
diction 1 is better oﬀ under the restriction than unrestricted linkage. The converse holds 
when the restriction is stringent (i.e., 훼 close to 0). By a continuity argument there exists 
an optimal restriction from the perspective of the monopsonistic jurisdiction. Note that the 
price eﬀect is absent in the case of price-taking jurisdiction 2 and the sign of dTC
2
 is hence 
unambiguous
This corresponds to a direct income transfer to jurisdiction 1. By the same token, we can 
deﬁne jurisdictions’ optimal restrictions in the general case.
Proposition 3.1 Given 휃 ∈ [0; 1] jurisdictional optimal quantitative limits are
 In the relevant ranges, 훼∗
1
 (resp. 훼∗
2
 ) is a decreasing (resp. increasing), convex function of 
휃 with 훼∗
1
(1) > 훼∗
2
(0) , inf{훼∗
1
} = lim
c
1
→c
+
2
훼
∗
1
(1) = 2∕3 and inf{훼∗
2
} = lim
c
2
→0+
훼
∗
2
(0) = 1∕2.
(8)dTC1 =
(
C
′
1
(a − Δ∗ + d휀) − 휏∗
)
d휀 + Δ∗d휏.
(9)dTC2 = −Δ
∗
d휏 > 0.
(10a)훼
∗
1
(휃) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
(c1 + c2)휃
2(c1 + c2)휃 − c1
if 휃 ≥ 휃̄ ≐
c1
c1 + c2
,
1 otherwise,
(10b)and, 훼
∗
2
(휃) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
(c1 + c2)(1 − 휃)
2(c1 + c2)(1 − 휃) − c2
if 휃 ≤ 휃̄,
1 otherwise.
Fig. 2  Quantity and tax restricted 
linkage equilibria. Δ̄ is the 
constrained transfer volume and 
휏̄
i
 the shadow price of emis-
sions in jurisdiction i under the 
restriction. Area Γ̄
i
 measures the 
efficiency gains from restricted 
permit trading accruing to i. 
Area L
i
 is the deadweight loss 
associated with the restriction 
on i’s side of the market. Area 
f + g alternatively measures the 
scarcity rent under a quantity 
restriction or tax revenues under 
a border tax
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Proof Relegated to “Quantity-Restricted Linkage”.   □
First, because 훼∗
1
 and 훼∗
2
 intersect once at 휃 = 휃̄ , the two jurisdictions can never pre-
fer a given quantity-restricted linkage simultaneously (relative to full linkage). Second, the 
range of relative bargaining powers over which the high-cost jurisdiction prefers a quan-
tity-restricted link over full linkage is smaller than for the low-cost jurisdiction. This is 
so because the former gains relatively more from the full link than the latter. Third, opti-
mal restrictions always authorize at least 50% of the full-link volume of transfers and 
the one under monopoly power is more stringent than the one under monopsony power 
( 훼∗
2
(0) < 훼∗
1
(1)).
3.2  Linkage with Border Taxes on Permit Transfers
A border tax on inter-jurisdictional permit transfers corresponds to the dual link restric-
tion of a quantitative limit. That is, to each tax rate there corresponds a unique authorized 
share of permit transfers and vice versa.28 While both instruments are equivalent in terms 
of equilibrium characterization in our deterministic framework, they will nonetheless diﬀer 
in their distributional aspects as well as political and linkage implications. Without loss of 
generality, consider that jurisdiction 1 imposes a proportional tax 휇 on 2-permit imports.29 
This tariﬀ only concerns inter-jurisdictional transfers and there is no levy on domestic 
transactions.30 Given 휇 , the restricted equilibrium is deﬁned by the triplet (휏̄1, 휏̄2, Δ̄) which, 
depending on the dispersion in autarky prices, satisﬁes
Again, the situation is depicted in Fig. 2. Equilibrium (11) is constrained to autarky if the 
tax rate is set at too high a level for given autarky prices. For instance, if 휏
1
= 2휏
2
 then the 
levy on import transactions should not exceed 50% for some transfers to occur. The border 
tax thus locates the restricted link outcome between autarky ( 휇 ≥ 1 − 휏
2
∕휏
1
 ) and full link-
age ( 휇 = 0).
The tax is distortionary and cost eﬃciency does not obtain. Speciﬁcally, the spread in 
jurisdictional prices is linearly proportional to the tax rate and the deadweight loss rises 
at the square of it. Overall abatement is constant but some mutually beneﬁcial transfers 
absent the tax do not take place ( ̄Δ ≤ Δ∗ , where Δ̄ is decreasing with the tax rate). Addi-
tionally, the increase in the permit price in 1 relative to full linkage is less than the tax 
because part of it is passed on to 2 where the permit price declines. The magnitude of 
(11)(휏̄1, 휏̄2, Δ̄) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(
휏1 − c1Δ̄, (1 − 휇)휏̄1,
(1 − 휇)휏1 − 휏2
(1 − 휇)c1 + c2
)
if 휇 ∈
[
0;1 − 휏2∕휏1
]
,(
휏1, 휏2, 0
)
otherwise.
28 The eﬀects of a tax on permit imports (resp. exports) levied by jurisdiction 1 (resp. 2) can be assimilated 
to those of an equivalent quantitative restriction with 휃 = 1 (resp. 휃 = 0).
29 The opposite situation where jurisdiction 2 imposes the same levy 휇 on permit exports would also satisfy 
the tax restricted-linkage equilibrium deﬁned in Eq. (11). The only diﬀerence is that tax revenues would 
accrue to (the regulator in) jurisdiction 2 instead.
30 Heindl et al. (2014) consider a bilateral link where one jurisdiction levies a domestic tax on intra-juris-
dictional emissions on top of the linked market price. Some abatement undertaken in this jurisdiction is 
thus attributable to this tax system, which undermines the price signal in the linked permit system.
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these price variations, i.e. the tax incidence, depends on relative jurisdictional abatement 
ﬂexibilities.31
However, there are two key diﬀerences from quantitative restrictions. First, a border 
tax allows for trades of permits whose jurisdictional prices diﬀer as jurisdiction 1 pays a 
markup on each 2-permit it imports. That is, jurisdictional permits are fungible. Second, a 
border tax raises revenues where a quantitative restriction generates a scarcity rent instead. 
Distributional aspects of the restriction are thus clearer as the revenues f + g are collected 
by (the regulator in) 1 while under an equivalent quantitative restriction the corresponding 
scarcity rent is unclearly divided between (the representative ﬁrms in) 1 and 2.
Speciﬁcally, relative to full linkage the imposition of a border tax by jurisdiction 1 is 
unambiguously detrimental to jurisdiction 2. This is attributable to impeded inter-juris-
dictional trade ( L
2
 ) and diminished terms of trade (g). Although its eﬃciency gains are 
reduced, jurisdiction 1 also raises tax revenues f + g . It is thus better oﬀ with the tax than 
under full linkage provided that g > L
1
 . This holds true for small tax rates, which high-
lights the standard trade-oﬀ between the level of the tax rate ( 휇 ) and the width of the tax 
base ( ̄Δ).
Corollary 3.2 The optimal tax rate is 휇∗ = (c
1
− c
2
)∕(3c
1
) and jurisdiction 1 is better off 
from the border tax regime than full linkage if 휇 ∈ [0; 휇̄] where 휇̄ > 휇∗.
Proof Special case of Proposition 3.1 with 휃 = 1 . See also “Border Tax-Restricted Link-
age”.   □
3.3  Linkage with Exchange Rates on Relative Permit Values
We let 휌 > 0 denote the rate at which emission reductions occurring in 1 are converted into 
emission reductions occurring in 2 through inter-jurisdictional exchange of permits. That 
is, one unit of abatement in 1 is worth 휌 unit of abatement in 2. We deﬁne the linked market 
휌-equilibrium by the following joint compliance cost minimization programme
We assume the aggregate constraint on emissions binds and let Δ̄
i
(휌) denote the variation 
in emissions in jurisdiction i at the 휌-equilibrium relative to autarky. Market closure yields 
Δ̄
2
(휌) = −휌Δ̄
1
(휌) and the interior market 휌-equilibrium is characterized by the necessary 
ﬁrst-order condition
With quadratic abatement cost functions, abatement unit transfers from 2 to 1 amount to
(12)min(e1 ,e2)∈(0;e0)2
⟨C1(e0 − e1) + C2(e0 − e2)⟩ subject to 휌e1 + e2 ≤ (1 + 휌)휔.
(13)C
′
1
(e
0
− 휔 − Δ̄
1
(휌)) = 휌C′
2
(e
0
− 휔 + 휌Δ̄
1
(휌)).
(14)Δ̄1(휌) =
휏
1
− 휌휏
2
c
1
+ 휌2c
2
≥ 0 ⇔ 휌 ≤ 휏
1
∕휏
2
.
31 Whether a tax is raised on demand or supply, the tax burden falls on both sellers and buyers. The tax 
incidence then depends on the relative price elasticity of demand and supply, with the more price-inelastic 
side of the market incurring most of the burden.
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There are two eﬀects consecutive to the introduction of an exchange rate, namely fungibil-
ity of jurisdictional abatement units does not hold (emission conversion, or EC eﬀect) and 
jurisdictional marginal abatement costs are adjusted for the exchange rate in equilibrium 
(MAC eﬀect). First, for a given volume of inter-jurisdictional permit transfer, an exchange 
rate speciﬁes a rate of conversion between emission reductions in 1 and 2, thereby chang-
ing overall abatement. Accounting for the sole EC eﬀect, more or less overall abatement 
occurs in equilibrium relative to the benchmark. Second, the ratio of jurisdictional mar-
ginal abatement costs in equilibrium is determined by the exchange rate. Accounting for 
the sole MAC eﬀect, an exchange rate induces a deadweight loss and modiﬁes incentives 
for inter-jurisdictional transfers in a fashion akin to a border tax.
Proposition 3.3 Relative to full linkage, in an interior market 휌-equilibrium
(i)  jurisdiction 1 raises emissions i.f.f. 휌 < 1 and jurisdiction 2 curbs emissions i.f.f. 
(휌 − 1)(휌 − 휌̄) < 0 with 휌̄ ≐
c1(휏1−휏2)
c1휏2+c2휏1
∈ (0; 휏1∕휏2);
(ii)  the additional aggregate level of abatement satisfies 훾(휌) ≐ (휌 − 1)Δ̄
1
(휌) , which is 
positive i.f.f. 휌 ∈ (1; 휏1∕휏2) and maximal at 휌 = 휌̂ ≐ (휏1∕휏2)
1∕2.
Proof Relegated to “Linkage with Exchange Rates”.   □
When parity does not hold, jurisdictional abatements are not equivalent and aggregate 
emissions vary as a result of inter-jurisdictional permit trading. We see from Eq. (14) that 
permits flow in the natural direction provided that the exchange rate is smaller than the 
ratio of autarky prices. We also note from Eq. (13) that cost efficiency obtains only under 
parity ( 휌 = 1 ) and that the (휏
1
∕휏
2
)-equilibrium replicates autarky. Indeed, this rate makes 
up for the autarky price wedge and there is no incentive to trade. These observations delin-
eate three trading regimes depending on the value of the exchange rate w.r.t. parity (full 
linkage) and 휏
1
∕휏
2
 (autarky) whose properties are listed in Table 1.32
Reduction zone ( 1 ≤ 휌 ≤ 휏
1
∕휏
2
 ) The dispersion in jurisdictional marginal abatement 
costs adjusted for the exchange rate is reduced and the conversion rate is favorable to juris-
diction 1. The market 휌-equilibrium is depicted in Fig. 3. Controlling for the EC eﬀect, this 
leads to less abatement transfers than is mutually beneﬁcial in a full link. Controlling for 
the MAC eﬀect, the 1-permit value is inﬂated, i.e. the exchange rate reduces the demand 
for 2-permits in jurisdiction 1 while increasing the demand for 1-permits in both juris-
dictions (but jurisdiction 2 remains net exporter). Consequently, holding 2-permit imports 
constant, less emissions are allowed into jurisdiction 1 than under full linkage. In other 
words, holding abatement transfers constant, jurisdiction 2 abates 휌-as-many times more. 
These two eﬀects combined yield higher overall abatement relative to the benchmark. Rel-
ative to full linkage, jurisdiction 1 emits less while jurisdiction 2 may emit more ( 휌 > 휌̄ ) or 
less ( 휌 < 휌̄ ) but overall, total abatement increases.
Amplification zone ( 휌 ≤ 1 ) The dispersion in jurisdictional marginal abatement costs 
adjusted for the exchange rate is amplified and the conversion rate is favorable to jurisdic-
tion 2. Controlling for the EC eﬀect, this is conducive to more exchanges of abatement than 
under full linkage. Controlling for the MAC eﬀect, the 1-permit value is deﬂated. Permits 
32 Schneider et al. (2017) identify the three same trading zones but name them diﬀerently.
 S. Quemin, C. de Perthuis 
1 3
keep on flowing in the natural direction but since one 2-permit is worth 휌-as-many 1-permit 
more emissions occur overall. These two eﬀects combined yield less aggregate abatement 
than in the benchmark. Relative to full linkage, jurisdiction 1 emits more while jurisdiction 
2 may emit more ( 휌 < 휌̄ ) or less ( ̄휌 < 휌 ) but overall, total abatement decreases.
Inversion zone ( 휌 > 휏
1
∕휏
2
 ) The dispersion in jurisdictional marginal abatement costs 
adjusted for the exchange rate is inverted and the conversion rate is favorable to jurisdic-
tion 1 (even more so than in the reduction zone). The exchange rate suﬃciently reduces 
the demand for 2-permits in jurisdiction 1 and increases the demand for 1-permits in 
both jurisdictions for jurisdiction 1 to become the net permit exporter. This regime is less 
cost eﬃcient than autarky since abatement occurs where it is most expensive. Relative to 
autarky, jurisdiction 1 (resp. 2) abates (resp. emits) more. Since the exchange rate inﬂates 
the 1-permit value, this results in aggregate emissions higher than in the benchmark.
Note that aggregate eﬃciency gains no longer are a proper measure of cost eﬃciency 
since overall abatement varies with the exchange rate. Loosely speaking, the more distant 
휌 from parity, the bigger the dispersion in jurisdictional marginal abatement costs at the 휌
-equilibrium and the lower the degree of cost eﬃciency.33 An exchange rate aﬀects both the 
size of the aggregate eﬃciency gains and its repartition across jurisdictions in the follow-
ing manner
Aggregate eﬃciency gains decrease with 휌 as long as 휌 ≤ 휏
1
∕휏
2
 , are nil at 휌 = 휏
1
∕휏
2
 and 
increase with 휌 thereafter. In addition, jurisdiction 1 (resp. 2) gets a higher share of these 
gains when 휌 ≤ (resp. ≥)휌̂ . Thus, with only eﬃciency gains in mind, jurisdiction 1 (resp. 
2) would like the exchange rate to be as small (resp. large) as possible. This line of rea-
soning, however, does not account for the induced variation in aggregate emissions. In 
“Appendix  3” we show that factoring in this shift in emissions mitigates jurisdictional 
preferences for otherwise unrealistically large or small rates. Here, in the following special 
case, we illustrate an important implication of the exchange rate induced ﬂexibility in over-
all emissions in terms of ambition setting as a dynamic process.
Corollary 3.4 Both jurisdictions are better off under full linkage with adjusted caps 
(휔1,휔2) = (휔,휔 − 훾(휌̂)) than under 휌̂-equilibrium with initial caps (휔,휔).
Proof Relegated to “Linkage with Exchange Rates”.   □
This highlights that exchange rates have potential to increase environmental ambition 
over time. Indeed, consider that jurisdictions initiate linkage with an exchange rate that 
triggers additional abatement relative to autarky. Corollary 3.4 then suggests that, all else 
equal, both jurisdictions have an incentive to transition to full linkage with domestic caps 
adjusted so as to generate overall abatement commensurate with that under the exchange 
rate.34
(15)Γ̄1(휌) + Γ̄2(휌) =
(
휏
1
− 휌휏
2
)2
2
(
c
1
+ 휌2c
2
) with Γ̄1(휌)∕Γ̄2(휌) = c1∕(c2휌
2).
33 Gains in liquidity should be similar to those under full linkage because permits are fungible.
34 This ﬁnding invites a follow-on analysis to formally examine such sequential cap-adjustment processes.
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4  Policy Discussion and Comparative Analysis
We take our modelling exercise as a basis for a policy-oriented discussion of the com-
parative merits and political feasibility of each type of restriction. We further draw on real-
world experiences with emissions trading, linking and restrictions. In order to both accom-
modate these facts and enrich the discussion, we will, at times, slightly deviate from the 
simple model of Sects. 2 and 3.
To start with, Fig. 4 is helpful in displaying the comparative eﬀects of link restrictions 
in the overall-abatement-cost-eﬃciency space relative to autarky. Details on the calibra-
tion and additional numerical illustrations can be found in “Appendix  2”. The grey line 
describes the economic outcomes along the continuum of quantitative restrictions and bor-
der taxes. The black curve depicts relative cost eﬃciency as a function of relative overall 
abatement along the continuum of exchange rates. It delineates the reduction zone in the 
upper-right quadrant, the ampliﬁcation zone in the upper-left quadrant and the inversion 
Table 1  Relative properties of the three trading regimes
Ji jurisdiction i, FL full linkage, A autarky, † except for very small rates, ‡ not a welfare measure (only 
account for eﬃciency gains from permit trade and ignore shifts in overall emission levels)
Reduction zone Ampliﬁcation zone Inversion zone
Relative permit value J1 > J2 J2 > J1 J1≫ J2
Permit ﬂow J1 → J2 J1 → J2 J2 → J1
Overall abatement Higher than A/FL Lower than A/FL Lower than A/FL
Cost eﬃciency Higher than A Higher than A† lower than A
Lower than FL Lower than FL Lower than FL
Emissions w.r.t. FL J1: lower J1: higher J1: Lower
J2: higher i.f.f. 휌 > 휌̄ J2: higher i.f.f. 휌 < 휌̄ J2: higher
Permit prices 휏∗ < 휏̄
1
< 휏
1
 ; 휏̄
2
> 휏
2
휏̄
1
< 휏
∗ ; 휏̄
2
> 휏
2
휏̄
1
> 휏
1
휏̄
2
< 휏
∗ i.f.f. 휌 > 휌̄ 휏̄
2
< 휏
∗ i.f.f. 휌 < 휌̄ 휏̄
2
< 휏
2
Gains from trade‡ Γ̄
1
> Γ̄
2
 i.f.f. 휌 < 휌̂ Γ̄
1
> Γ̄
2
Γ̄
2
> Γ̄
1
Fig. 3  Restricted linkage equi-
librium in the reduction zone 
(with 휌 > 휌̄ > 1 ). The two curved 
dotted arrows rotate the line of 
slope 휌c
2
 to the ampliﬁcation 
zone (AZ) and the inversion zone 
(IZ) and point outside of the 
reduction zone represented by the 
hull ⟨e0c2, e0c1⟩
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zone in the lower-left quadrant. Speciﬁcally, Fig.  4 clearly shows that both quantitative 
restrictions and border taxes affect cost efficiency but preserve overall abatement while 
exchange rates have an impact along both of these two dimensions.
4.1  Quantitative Transfer Restrictions
Under a quantitative restriction transfers are restricted up to the authorized limit if bind-
ing; if not, full linkage should obtain. Thus, because transfers are confined within a pre-
defined range a quantitative restriction is an attractive instrument if jurisdictions seek to 
have a direct handle on the quantity-side consequences of a link and retain a certain degree 
of oversight over their domestic systems. On the one hand, a high-price environmentally-
inclined jurisdiction may wish to limit imports to avoid those link-induced consequences 
potentially pitting the economic gains from linkage against broader environmental or 
equity concerns. This would ensure that a certain volume of abatement occurs domesti-
cally (along with the ancillary benefits and reputational aspects thereof) or assuage fears 
about over-allocation in exporting jurisdictions that could dilute domestic ambition. On the 
other hand, a low-price jurisdiction may desire to limit exports in a bid to contain the link-
induced permit price rise.
That said, some implications of a binding quantitative restriction are not as straightfor-
ward as they seem to be on the face of it. This is attributable to the coexistence of different 
price signals and undetermined transaction prices. Since one permit may have two distinct 
prices whether it is sold domestically ( ̄휏
i
(훼) ) or abroad ( ̄휏(훼; 휃) ) quantitative restrictions 
may lead to speculative transactions by creating perverse incentives for firms to make prof-
its on secondary markets that are disconnected from abatement-related fundamentals.
A related issue is the existence of a scarcity rent whose apportionment among juris-
dictions’ constituent firms is not clear ex ante. To mitigate these uncertain distributional 
effects, some mechanisms may be devised to allocate the rent between them. For instance, 
Fig. 4  Comparative effects of the three link restrictions relative to autarky
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restrictions could be formulated at firm levels, e.g., as a percentage of firms’ individual 
compliance obligations. Alternatively, authorities could issue a certain number of licenses 
and require that firms attach, say, one license to each foreign permit they remit for compli-
ance. Because the rent distribution may serve as a negotiation lever, linkage can be facili-
tated if jurisdictions are able to agree on how to allocate these licenses among them. While 
this parallel license market may offer a better management of the distributional aspects of 
the restricted link it does not determine how transaction license prices are fixed and, ulti-
mately, the share of the total rent one can extract.35 Additionally, administrative and trans-
action costs associated with setting up and running this parallel market might shrink the 
gross benefits of linkage. Note, however, that auctioning off licenses may limit these costs 
and redirect the rent from the firms to the regulatory authority.
Under conditions of uncertainty, we note that a restriction that turns out to be non-bind-
ing ex post might still affect permit trading and price formation. Indeed, Gronwald and 
Hintermann (2016) provide evidence that the probability of non-bindingness of the usage 
quota on Kyoto credits affected the offset-permit price spread in the EU ETS. Thus, in a 
context where abatement potentials, costs and baseline emissions have proven to be uncer-
tain, a relatively stringent restriction has joint potential to bring about a relatively impor-
tant share of the full-link gains, effectively contain the reach of the link as well as reduce 
uncertainty about its bindingness and related impact on price formation.
As a transitory linkage mechanism, quantity restrictions seem to be the natural route to 
gradually allow for unlimited trading between two quantity instruments. However, the ratio 
of jurisdictional shadow prices is undetermined ex ante, hard to infer ex post and transac-
tion prices may ﬂuctuate independently of fundamentals. Permit prices may thus no longer 
reﬂect jurisdictional marginal abatement costs, which is essential information in the politi-
cal process of gradually scaling up the link in order to assess alignment in programs and 
ambition.
4.2  Border Taxes on Permit Transfers
Although there is a bijection between price and quantity restrictions in terms of equilib-
rium characterization, their distributional and other link-related effects differ. Because the 
ratio of jurisdictional prices is fixed by the tax rate, price signals are stronger as they better 
reﬂect marginal abatement costs, which is key information for regulators in scaling up the 
link. Moreover, a border tax raises revenues so that regulators have a better handle on some 
distributional effects of their policy relative to a quantitative restriction which generates a 
scarcity rent whose distribution between jurisdictional firms is unclear a priori.36 Control-
ling for the induced deadweight loss, a border tax operates an inter-jurisdictional surplus 
transfer. In other words, taxes have a redistributive potential that may serve as leverage 
to foster linkage negotiations and can thus be seen as surrogates for otherwise politically 
unpalatable lump-sum transfers (Victor 2015).
Under conditions of uncertainty, the dual property between price and quantity restric-
tions would vanish (Weitzman 1974). In practice, this relates to the comparative advantage 
of having a fixed maximum level of permit transfers with a variable ratio of jurisdictional 
35 With a binding restriction the license price would also be determined by Eq. (7).
36 Note that unless tax revenues are redistributed to firms, they will always be worse off as a result of the 
tax-restricted link relative to full linkage and might thus voice opposition.
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prices versus a fixed price ratio and variable permit transfers. Note that because a bor-
der tax concerns permit prices the link equilibrium will always be aﬀected and potentially 
brought to autarky if the rate is set at too high a level. By contrast, quantitative restrictions 
may turn out to be non-binding, though this might still bear on price formation.
As a transitory linkage mechanism, border taxes may be more seamless than quantita-
tive restrictions in informing a full-link scale-up and managing associated distributional 
aspects. Note that small tax rates generate a sizeable share of the full-link gains but do not 
reduce much of its eﬀects. Conversely, too high a tax rate risks turning out to be detrimen-
tal (w.r.t. full linkage) even for the jurisdiction that collects revenues. Finally note that a 
border tax is a ﬁscal policy and might thus be relatively more complicated to pursue legis-
latively speaking than a quantity-based approach, for instance in the EU.37
4.3  Linkage with Exchange Rates
As with a border tax an exchange rate sets the ratio of jurisdictional marginal abatement 
costs (MAC eﬀect). Additionally, it also modiﬁes the one-for-one compliance value of 
jurisdictional permits, i.e., jurisdictional abatement eﬀorts are not equivalent (EC eﬀect). 
As noted by Burtraw et  al. (2017), exchange rates thus have potential to adjust for pro-
grammes’ stringencies even though cost eﬃciency is reduced.38 Note that taking this line 
of reasoning to its logical extreme (i.e., 휌 ∼ 휏
1
∕휏
2
 ) implies the link would resemble autarky. 
Additionally, an exchange rate may also serve as a means to accommodate other economic 
criteria or types of political and environmental preferences.39
Cost eﬃciency may be higher or lower than under autarky but is always lower than under 
full linkage. Moreover, aggregate emissions vary as a result of inter-jurisdictional trading 
due to the EC eﬀect. In particular, the volume of unit transfers can increase, decrease or 
even be reversed relative to full linkage. Thus, as compared to autarky, the aggregate impli-
cations of an exchange rate in both economic and environmental terms could happen to be 
beneﬁcial (reduction zone) as well detrimental (inversion zone). In loose terms, one can 
imagine that the reduction zone is likely to be targeted by regulators. In particular, if they 
prioritize environmental outcomes they should aim for a rate close to 휌̂ = (휏
1
∕휏
2
)1∕2 . If, 
instead, they wish to increase market liquidity without bearing much of the other eﬀects of 
a full link, they should set 휌 close to 휏
1
∕휏
2
.
Under conditions of uncertainty, however, selecting an exchange rate is likely to prove 
diﬃcult which can lead to unintended and possibly detrimental consequences. The diﬃ-
culty is indeed twofold. First, due to ex-ante uncertainty about programmes’ actual strin-
gencies (hence autarky prices) it is complicated to select the rate right in the ﬁrst place.40 
37 Indeed, pursuant to Article 192 §2 of the Lisbon Treaty (2007), policies that are deemed to be ‘primarily 
of a ﬁscal nature’ require unanimity between Member States to be enacted. Additionally, we note the indi-
rect but related concern about WTO-compatibility voiced in the broader case of border (tax) adjustments.
38 Burtraw et al. (2017) implement a 3-for-1 rate in linking California and RGGI (one CCA is worth three 
RGAs) arguing that this «provides a rough adjustment for the relative stringencies of the two programmes 
but reduces the opportunities for cost savings from shifting CO
2
 emissions from RGGI to California» . Note 
that this reverses the natural direction of abatement ﬂows, i.e., the 3-for-1 rate belongs to the inversion zone.
39 Exchange rates could adjust for discrepancies in permits’ mitigation value. In this respect, see the docu-
mentation provided under the auspices of the World Bank’s Globally Networked Carbon Markets Initiative.
40 This issue is somewhat mitigated if markets to be linked are already in operation as historical price lev-
els can help guide the selection of the exchange rate. Moreover, selecting an exchange rate can be challeng-
ing if there exist information asymmetries between covered ﬁrms and regulators (Holland and Yates 2015).
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Second, it is also challenging to duly adjust the rate ex post since autarky prices that would 
have prevailed absent the link restriction are not directly observable. Although counter-
factual autarky prices could be inferred, it would only be so with a lag of one compliance 
period at best. The risk of error and possible detrimental outcomes (e.g., of the inversion 
zone) in selecting the policy handle is higher than for the other two restrictions, whose 
associated outcomes are always confined within autarky and full linkage.
As a transitory linkage mechanism, an exchange rate has potential to increase environ-
mental ambition over time when emissions cap diminution is not feasible up front. Indeed, 
penalized schemes—that is, schemes for which conversion rates are not favorable—have an 
incentive to raise domestic ambition provided that their domestic abatement units become 
gradually traded with parity. In fact, Corollary 3.4 shows that this ratcheting up of ambition 
would be in the interest of each party. Note also that since an exchange rate does not induce 
explicit rents, the transition to a full link may be easier than for a quantitative restriction.
4.4  Two Special Cases of Link Restrictions
We now discuss two additional restrictions, namely unilateral linkage and discount rates, as 
special cases of quantitative restrictions and exchange rates, respectively.
Unilateral (or conditional) linkage Unilateral linkage is a special case of quantita-
tive restrictions whereby entities in one jurisdiction can remit foreign permits for domes-
tic compliance but not vice versa. Should the unilateral link be established in the natu-
ral direction of trade its implications would closely resemble those of a full link save for 
the non-fungibility of permits. Conversely, the one-way link may also be inactive, i.e., an 
autarky-like situation persists. In other words, unilateral linkage can be observationally 
indistinguishable from a full link until until some uncertainty about the cost structure is 
resolved.
Note that unilateral linkage is thus of a conditional nature, which may entice jurisdic-
tions to increase ambition. Indeed, imagine a one-way link between a ‘high-ambition, high-
price’ system 1 and a ‘low-ambition, low-price’ system 2 whereby only 1 can purchase 
2-units. In this sense, full linkage is conditional on 2 increasing ambition and note that the 
unilateral link constitutes a soft price ﬂoor for 1. Additionally, unilateral linkage can miti-
gate price uncertainty and distributional aspects (there is no scarcity rent) associated with 
quantitative restrictions.
A good example of active one-way linkage is the unilateral integration of the European 
aviation sector into the EU ETS as of 2012 whereby aircraft operators can surrender per-
mits from the stationary sector (EUAs) in lieu of aviation permits (EUAAs) for compliance 
but not the other way around. Since 2013, the aviation sector has been short by around 20 
MtCO2eq each year, which represents about a third of covered emissions (EEA 2017). The 
aviation sector is thus a net buyer of EUAs and the EUAA price closely follows the EUA 
price.41
Both the Norway-EU and aborted Australia-EU unilateral links were envisaged as ini-
tial, transitory steps toward fully-ﬂedged links. In Phase I of the EU ETS and until the 
extension of the EU ETS to EEA–EFTA countries by late 2007, Norwegian firms could 
41 Though the demand for EUAs from the aviation sector is bound to increase over time, the future of this 
unilateral link depends on the pending international CORSIA regulation.
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surrender EUAs domestically but not vice versa.42 This one-way link originated in a unilat-
eral decision on the part of Norway to help prepare for full integration to the EU ETS, e.g. 
gradual market design alignment. In mid-2012 Australia and the EU Commission agreed 
to link up their domestic ETSs following a two-step process whereby Australia would first 
be unilaterally linked to the EU (EUAs recognized in Australia, but not vice versa) before 
the link would become two-way three years later. For compatibility with the EU ETS, each 
step was contingent upon gradual design adjustments in Australia.43
These three experiences44 indicate that unilateral links (1) can be established pursuant 
to unilateral or joint decisions; (2) do not require market designs to be as much aligned as 
for bilateral links; (3) may help initiate linkage while giving more time to bring schemes 
into sufficient alignment deemed necessary for bilateral links to be established seamlessly.
The elaboration of the RECLAIM programme also underlines the practical merits of 
unilateral linkage.45 To account for spatial factors the Los Angeles air basin was initially 
divided into 38 zones without interzonal trading. This would have massively reduced the 
economic gains from using a market-based policy relative to command and control. One 
alternative was to create a single market with trading ratios accounting for spatial discrep-
ancies but quantification of these ratios proved complicated and the resulting scheme alto-
gether would have been cumbersome and unworkable. The final programme solely com-
prised two geographical zones (upwind sources, located near the coast and contributing 
more to elevated ozone levels and downwind sources, located inland) with interzonal trad-
ing allowed only from upwind to downwind sources (Tietenberg 1995; Fromm and Han-
sjürgens 1996; Johnson and Pekelney 1996).
Discount rates Discount rates are the unilateral version of exchange rates. That is, when 
jurisdiction 1 applies a given conversion ratio to 2-permits, 2 need not impose a conversion 
ratio to 1-permits that is equal to the inverse of the former. Therefore, discount rates may 
be asymmetrical, i.e., of diﬀerent magnitudes depending on the direction of trade. When 
the diﬀerential in autarky prices surpasses the discount rate its implications are similar to 
those of an equivalent exchange rate (same EC and MAC eﬀects) but full permit fungibil-
ity does not obtain. As noted by Schneider et al. (2017) this asymmetry may have poten-
tial to overcome some challenges inherent to exchanges rates. First, discount rates need 
not be mutually agreed upon so that jurisdictions can maintain relatively more ﬂexibility 
in selecting and adjusting the discount rates they use. Second, if both jurisdictions were 
to implement discount rates higher than unity on inﬂowing foreign permits, then, what-
ever the realized direction of the permit ﬂow, overall abatement and cost eﬃciency would 
42 Only one EUA transaction was recorded as the price for Norwegian permits was well below the price of 
CERs (Mehling and Haites 2009). The unilateral link could thus be seen as a de facto soft price ceiling for 
Norway.
43 For instance, Australia committed to gradually scrap its price ﬂoor and ceiling. See Jotzo and Betz 
(2009) for more details on the compatibility between the EU ETS and Australia Carbon Pricing Mecha-
nism (CPM). Although linkage negotiations were conducted pursuant to Article 25 of the EU ETS Direc-
tive concessions pertaining to design alignment were exclusively envisaged on the Australian side of the 
link because Europe had more political weight and thus ‘design pull’. The project of an intercontinental link 
between Australia and Europe stalled when the CPM was oﬃcially repealed in mid-2014.
44 California is also currently examining rules that would speciﬁcally allow for Californian permits to be 
used in other jurisdictions, i.e., de facto unilateral links. We thank a reviewer for bringing this to our atten-
tion.
45 The REgional CLean Air Incentives Market was launched in 1994 to regulate ozone (a non-uniformly 
mixed pollutant) levels in the Los Angeles basin. Environmental objectives were reached (without hot 
spots) and compliance costs were reduced w.r.t. command-and-control approaches (Fowlie et al. 2012).
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increase relative to autarky, which is congruent with the ‘desirable’ characteristics of the 
reduction zone.
5  Conclusion
We compared various restrictions on permit trading in the context of a bilateral link 
between ETSs in gradually approaching unrestricted, full linkage. Restricted linkage cre-
ates a trade-oﬀ between eliminating some impediments to full linkage and undermining a 
fundamental reason for linking in the ﬁrst place (i.e., cost eﬃciency) which justiﬁes a tem-
porary use of restrictions moving toward unrestricted linkage. This trial phase may allow 
to test the eﬀects of the link and, by limiting its reach, assuage some of the induced eﬀects 
and perceived risks. This also gives more time and ﬂexibility for partners to reconcile their 
policy diﬀerences and bring their respective schemes further into alignment for a full link 
to be established seamlessly. A few years down the road, partners may decide to scale up 
the link. Otherwise, should trial not be conclusive the link may be severed.46
We tried to keep the model as simple as possible to have a clear, unifying framework 
which, in conjunction with lessons from real-world experiences, served as a basis for a 
less formal, policy-oriented discussion of comparative advantages and weaknesses of link 
restrictions. On the face of it, quantitative restrictions seem to be the most implementa-
tion-friendly route to a full link between quantity instruments. In particular, they provide 
a direct quantity handle on the reach of the link. However, there is uncertainty about price 
formation and the distribution of the scarcity rent, which may hinder the transition to a full 
link. These aspects are mitigated with a border tax, which should ensure a better manage-
ment of distributional outcomes, less undesirable price ﬂuctuations and better information 
on jurisdictional marginal abatement costs. Exchange rates can be used to correct for dis-
crepancies in programmes’ stringencies and have potential to increase ambition over time. 
On the ﬂip side, however, they can be challenging to select and adjust, which might lead 
detrimental outcomes.
In order to hammer out a linkage agreement as workable and wieldy as possible, regu-
lators can pick the restriction (or combination thereof) that best assuages dominant link-
related risks and ﬁts the negotiation and domestic contexts. As experience corroborates, 
transitory unilateral linkage may well strike a good balance between the ‘ideal’ and the 
‘practical’ in translating economic theory into speciﬁc policy design elements.47 In addi-
tion, the insights gained from this simple framework can help evaluate the eﬀects of trade 
restrictions in the context of networked ETSs. An recent example is the ICAR Platform 
proposed by Füssler et al. (2016), which provides a structure to which ETSs may dock on 
a voluntary basis contingent upon their meeting a set of predeﬁned requirements. Docked 
ETSs retain some discretion in the form of unilateral imposition of both quantitative 
restrictions on permit outﬂows/inﬂows and qualitative restrictions (e.g., discount rates) de 
facto assigning relative compliance values to foreign permits.
Finally, we identify three alleys for future research. First, although we treat jurisdictions as 
monolithic entities and abstract from intra-jurisdictional distributional aspects, we stress that 
46 Restriction-induced rents may not entice recipients to roll out a full link. In a diﬀerent but similar con-
text, Tol (2009) underlines that less stringent restrictions are not Pareto-superior precisely for this reason. It 
should thus ideally be spelt out in the agreement that the use of restrictions is only temporary.
47 This echoes the words of Tietenberg (2006) that «in practice, one common approach to resolving spatial 
concerns involves a system of directional trading».
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this issue deserves more attention.48 Indeed, the way restricted linkage aﬀects ﬁrms and other 
jurisdictional constituencies is bound to shape regulators’ room for maneuver in selecting and 
implementing restrictions.49 Second, while our model is static, it is of key interest to under-
stand the interplay between permit banking and alternative link restrictions.50 Indeed, each 
link restriction will distort ﬁrms’ inter-temporal decisions and market functioning in its own 
way. One can conjecture that, like in the static case we consider, unilateral linking may limit 
the amount of additional induced distortions.51 Third, in a strategic environment, we under-
line that letting jurisdictions bargain over future linking rules (e.g., in the form of restrictions) 
rather than over domestic caps (that are strategic substitutes and thus prone to free-riding) 
may be more suitable for the emergence of voluntary cooperation through linkage.52
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Appendix 1: Analytical Derivations and Collected Proofs
Quantity-Restricted Linkage
Let 훼 ∈ [0; 1] be the authorized share of inter-jurisdictional abatement transfers rel-
ative to full linkage. In the constrained link, jurisdiction 1 (resp. 2) abates a − 훼Δ∗ 
(resp. a + 훼Δ∗ ) and the equilibrium marginal abatement cost is 휏̄
1
(훼) = c
1
(a − 훼Δ∗) 
(resp. 휏̄
2
(훼) = c
2
(a + 훼Δ∗) ). Note also that 휏̄
1
(훼) − 휏̄
2
(훼) = (1 − 훼)(휏
1
− 휏
2
) and that 
|휏
i
− 휏̄
i
(훼)| = c
i
훼Δ∗ , for i = {1, 2} . The scarcity rent S, the deadweight loss L and juris-
dictional economic gains from trade Γ̄
i
 then obtain from simple area computations 
(e.g., from Fig. 2), that is 
 The scarcity rent S is increasing (resp. decreasing) in 훼 for 훼 ≤(resp. ≥)1/2. The dead-
weight loss L is decreasing in 훼 at a decreasing rate. Jurisdictional economic gains Γ̄
i
 are 
increasing in 훼 less than linearly but at an increasing rate. Addintionally, note that
That is, the size of the scarcity rent relative to that of the economic gains from trade accru-
ing to jurisdictions is signiﬁcant for a wide range of quantitative restrictions. The way the 
rent is apportioned among jurisdictions is thus of political importance in terms of linkage 
design. Finally note that since overall abatement is constant the degree of cost eﬃciency 
relative to full linkage can be measured by the ratio of the total surplus under the restriction 
훼 to the total surplus under full linkage, which is given by the index
Although any binding quantitative restriction is detrimental in aggregate terms, this is not 
necessarily so from a jurisdictional perspective, as shown below.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Fix 휃 ∈ [0; 1] . The surplus accruing to jurisdiction 1 under the 
restriction 훼 consists of gains from trade and a share of the scarcity rent, that is
The optimal restriction from jurisdiction 1’s perspective thus satisﬁes
for which the ﬁrst-order condition simpliﬁes to
provided that 훼∗
1
 belongs to [0;  1]; otherwise, full linkage is preferred, 
i.e. 훼∗
1
= 1 . Note that 훼∗
1
≥ 0 and 훼∗
1
≤ 1 require 휃 ≥ 휃̄∕2 and 휃 ≥ 휃̄ where 
(A.1a)S(훼) = 훼Δ
∗(휏̄1(훼) − 휏̄2(훼)) = Δ
∗(휏1 − 휏2)훼(1 − 훼),
(A.1b)2L(훼) = (1 − 훼)Δ
∗(휏̄1(훼) − 휏̄2(훼)) = Δ
∗(휏1 − 휏2)(1 − 훼)
2
,
(A.1c)2Γ̄i(훼) = 훼Δ
∗|휏
i
− 휏̄
i
(훼)| = c
i
Δ∗2훼2.
(A.2)S(훼) ≥ Γ̄1(훼) + Γ̄2(훼) ⇔ 휏1 − 휏2 ≤ 3(휏̄1(훼) − 휏̄2(훼)) ⇔ 훼 ≤ 2∕3.
(A.3)I(훼) ≐
Γ∗
1
+ Γ∗
2
− L(훼)
Γ∗
1
+ Γ∗
2
=
훼Δ∗(휏
1
+ 휏̄
1
(훼) − (휏
2
+ 휏̄
2
(훼)))
Δ∗(휏
1
− 휏
2
)
= 훼(2 − 훼).
(A.4)Γ1(훼; 휃) ≐ Γ̄1(훼) + S1(훼; 휃) = Γ
∗
1
훼
2 + 휃S(훼).
(A.5)
훼
∗
1
(휃) ≐ arg max
훼∈[0;1]
⟨Γ1(훼; 휃)⟩,
(A.6)(c1 + c2)휃 = (2(c1 + c2)휃 − c1)훼
∗
1
,
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휃̄ ≐ c
1
∕(c
1
+ c
2
) ≥ 1∕2 , respectively. Equation (A.6) thus holds for 휃 ≥ 휃̄ , which is 
congruent with Equation (10a). The proof proceeds similarly for jurisdiction 2 where 
훼
∗
2
(휃) ≐ arg max
훼∈[0;1]
⟨
Γ2(훼; 휃) ≐ Γ
∗
2
훼
2 + (1 − 휃)S(훼)
⟩
 .   □
Border Tax-Restricted Linkage
Consider that jurisdiction 1 unilaterally taxes imports of 2-permits at a proportional 
rate 휇 and does not share any of the revenues it collects. In the admissible tax range [
1; 1 − 휏2∕휏1
]
 , net permit imports are limited to a volume of Δ̄(휇) such that
Jurisdictional economic gains from trade are reduced to Γ̄
i
(휇) = c
i
(Δ̄(휇))2∕2 
and decreasing in the tax rate. The total surplus accruing to jurisdiction 1 is 
Γ1,t(휇) = Γ̄1(휇) + 휇휏̄1(휇)Δ̄(휇) = c1(Δ̄(휇))
2∕2 + 휇Δ̄(휇)(휏1 − c1Δ̄(휇)) where the second 
term corresponds to tax revenues. Therefore, jurisdiction 2 is always worse oﬀ w.r.t. full 
linkage but still better oﬀ w.r.t. autarky ( Γ∗
2
= Γ̄
2
(0) ≥ Γ̄
2
(휇) ≥ 0 ) while jurisdiction 1 can 
be better or worse oﬀ w.r.t. full linkage (but always better oﬀ w.r.t. autarky) as the diminu-
tion in economic gains from trade can be more or less than oﬀset by tax revenues. Indeed, 
it holds that
where the two bracketed terms are positive for all admissible rate 휇 . The sign of Γ′
1,t
 is thus 
ambiguous. However, by continuity of both Γ1,t and Γ
′
1,t
 and by noting that
along with Γ1,t
(
1 −
휏2
휏1
)
= 0 < Γ1,t(0) , there exist 휇
∗
1
≤ 휇̄
1
 both admissible such that juris-
diction 1’s surplus is maximized at 휇∗
1
 ( ̄Γ′
1
(휇∗
1
) = 0 ) and jurisdiction 1 is indiﬀerent between 
a tax on imports at a rate 휇̄
1
> 휇∗
1
 and no tax at all ( Γ1,t(휇̄1) = Γ1,t(0) = Γ
∗
1
 ). In aggregate, 
the tax on 2-permit imports results in a deadweight loss of
and taking the derivative gives
which is the sum of three positive terms. The deadweight loss is hence increasing in the tax 
rate or, equivalently, the aggregate surplus from the link is decreasing in the tax rate.
Notice the bijection between binding quantitative restrictions and admissible tax 
rates that exists in the deterministic, partial-equilibrium framework we consider. In par-
ticular, the tax rate that restricts net permit transfers up to an authorized share 훼 ∈ [0; 1] 
is such that
(A.7)
0 ≤ Δ̄(휇) =
(1 − 휇)휏1 − 휏2
(1 − 휇)c1 + c2
≤ Δ∗, Δ̄′(휇) = −
c1휏2 + c2휏1
((1 − 휇)c1 + c2)
2
< 0, and Δ̄′′(휇) < 0.
(A.8)Γ
′
1,t
(휇) = Δ̄′(휇)
[
c1Δ̄(휇) + 휇(휏1 − 2c1Δ̄(휇))
]
+ Δ̄(휇)
[
휏1 − c1Δ̄(휇)
]
,
(A.9)
Γ′
1,t
(0) =
c2(c2휏1 + c1휏2)
(c1 + c2)
3
(휏1 − 휏2) > 0 and Γ
′
1,t
(
1 −
휏2
휏1
)
= Δ̄′
(
1 −
휏2
휏1
)
(휏1 − 휏2) < 0,
(A.10)L(휇) = (Δ
∗ − Δ̄(휇))(휏̄1(휇) − 휏̄2(휇)) = 휇(Δ
∗ − Δ̄(휇))(휏1 − c1Δ̄(휇)),
(A.11)
L
′(휇) = (Δ∗ − Δ̄(휇))(휏1 − c1Δ̄(휇)) − Δ̄
′(휇)휇(휏1 − c1Δ̄(휇)) − c1Δ̄
′(휇)휇(Δ∗ − Δ̄(휇)) > 0,
(A.12)Δ̄(휇) = 훼Δ
∗
⇔ 휇 =
(1 − 훼)(c2
1
− c2
2
)
c1(c1(1 − 훼) + c2(1 + 훼))
,
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with 휇 = 0⇔ 훼 = 1 and 휇 = 1 − c
2
∕c
1
⇔ 훼 = 0 . However, a limit and a tax rate linked 
via Eq. (A.12) are not equivalent in terms of distributional aspects (e.g., for a scarcity rent 
and tax revenues of identical sizes, the rent apportionment depends on relative bargaining 
powers) or market functioning (e.g., transaction price formation). Finally, notice that the 
optimal tax rate on permit imports obtains as a special case of Eq. (10a) with 휃 = 1 , that is
There is no particular interest in determining an analytical value for 휇̄
1
 . In the symmetric 
case where jurisdiction 2 unilaterally imposes a tax 휇
2
 on 2-permit exports and keeps all 
the revenues to itself the optimal tax rate would satisfy 
Δ̄(휇∗
2
) = 훼∗
2
(0)Δ∗ ⇔ 휇∗
2
=
c
1
−c
2
c
1
+2c
2
> 휇∗
1
.
Linkage with Exchange Rates
Proof of Proposition 3.3 From Eq. (13) and market closure, any interior linked market 휌
-equilibrium is characterized by
Since Δ
1
(휌) ∼
0+
휏
1
c
1
 and Δ
1
(휌) ∼+∞
−휏
2
휌c
2
→+∞ 0
− , it holds that lim
0+
e
1
(휌) = e
0
 and 
lim+∞ e1(휌) = 휔 . The only relevant (positive) root of Δ
′
1
(휌) = 0 is 휌+ =
휏
1
휏
2
+
√
휏
2
1
휏
2
2
+
c
1
c
2
 . 
Similarly, Δ
2
(휌) ∼+∞
휏
2
c
2
 and Δ
2
(휌) ∼
0+
휌
2
휏
2
c
1
→
0+
0 so that lim+∞ e2(휌) = e0 and 
lim
0+
e
2
(휌) = 휔 . The only relevant (positive) root of Δ′
2
(휌) = 0 is 
휌
++
=
c
1
휏
2
c
2
휏
1
(√
1 +
c
2
휏
1
c
1
휏
2
− 1
)
 . Noting that 휌 = 1 is an obvious root of Δ
i
(휌) = Δ∗ for 
i = {1, 2} , it follows that 
 where 휌̄
1
≐
c
1
휏
2
+c
2
휏
1
c
2
(휏
1
−휏
2
)
> 0 and 휌̄2 ≐
c1(휏1−휏2)
c1휏2+c2휏1
∈ (0; 휏1∕휏2) . Statements (i) thus follows imme-
diately. Note that the threshold 휌̄
2
 satisfies
In our special case where 휔
1
= 휔
2
 , 휌̄
2
= 1⇔ 휏
1
= 3휏
2
⇔ c
1
= 3c
2
 . Note that when 휌̄
2
= 1 
emissions in jurisdiction 2 never pass below their full-linkage level.
Relative to the benchmark, additional aggregate abatement 훾(휌) obtains as the diﬀerence 
between aggregate emissions in the benchmark and in the 휌-equilibrium, that is
Recall that Δ̄
1
(휌) ≥ 0 i.f.f. 휌 ∈ [0; 휏1∕휏2] . Hence 훾(휌) ≥ 0 i.f.f. 휌 ∈ [1; 휏1∕휏2] . We then 
solve for
(A.13)Δ̄(휇
∗
1
) = 훼∗
1
(1)Δ∗ ⇔ 휇∗
1
= (c
1
− c
2
)∕3c
1
.
(A.14)Δ1(휌) =
휏1 − 휌휏2
c1 + 휌
2
c2
≥ 0⇔ 휌 ≤
휏1
휏2
, and Δ2(휌) = −휌Δ1(휌) ≥ 0 ⇔ 휌 ≥
휏1
휏2
.
(A.15a)Δ1(휌) ≥ Δ
∗
⇔ (휌 − 1)(휌 + 휌̄1) ≤ 0,
(A.15b)휌Δ1(휌) ≥ Δ
∗
⇔ (휌 − 1)(휌 − 휌̄2) ≤ 0,
(A.16)휌̄2 ≤ 1 ⇔
휏
1
휏
2
≤
2c
1
c
1
− c
2
⇔
c
1
c
2
≤
2(e
0
− 휔
2
) + (e
0
− 휔
1
)
e
0
− 휔
1
= 1 + 2
e
0
− 휔
2
e
0
− 휔
1
.
(A.17)훾(휌) ≐ 2휔 −
(
휔 + Δ̄
1
(휌) + 휔 − 휌Δ̄
1
(휌)
)
= (휌 − 1)Δ̄
1
(휌).
(A.18)훾
′(휌) = 0 ⇔ 휌2c
2
(휏
1
+ 휏
2
) − 2휌(c
2
휏
1
− c
1
휏
2
) − c
1
(휏
1
+ 휏
2
) = 0.
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Noting that by assumption 휏
i
= c
i
a , i = {1, 2} , then c
2
휏
1
= c
1
휏
2
 and additional aggregate 
abatement is maximized at 휌 = 휌̂ ≐ (휏
1
∕휏
2
)1∕2 .  □
Proof of Corollary 3.4 In the linked market 휌̂-equilibrium variations in jurisdictional emis-
sion levels as compared to autarky read
In total, aggregate abatement increases by
Assume that in lieu of implementing the exchange rate regime 휌̂ jurisdictions were to agree 
upon a full link where jurisdiction 2 would reduce its domestic cap in such a fashion that 
aggregate abatement would be equal to that in the 휌̂-equilibrium. That is, jurisdictional 
caps would be such that 휔̂
1
= 휔 and 휔̂
2
= 휔 − 훾(휌̂) . Under full linkage with jurisdictional 
caps (휔̂1, 휔̂2) permits continue to flow in the natural direction and unit transfers amount to
These two linkage regimes can be compared in terms of sole economic gains from trade 
because they are generative of the same aggregate level of emissions. In particular, juris-
diction i prefers the full link with domestic caps (휔̂1, 휔̂2) over the 휌̂-equilibrium with 
domestic caps (휔,휔) i.f.f. Δ̂ ≥ |Δ̂
i
| , which holds for i = {1, 2} since
Another interpretation than that proposed in the body of the paper is that, if the two juris-
dictions were to establish a link with an exchange rate aimed at correcting for too low an 
ambition level in jurisdiction 2, then they would both be better oﬀ from a full link with an 
equivalent downward-adjusted cap in jurisdiction 2.   □
Appendix 2: Numerical Simulations
Jurisdictions have the same domestic abatement objective, thus c
1
∕c
2
= 휏
1
∕휏
2
 . Equating 
this ratio to 3 ensures that 휌̄
2
= 1 and provides clear-cut results in terms of emission vari-
ations for jurisdiction 2 (see Eq. (A.15b)). The numerical results are presented in relative 
values (with full linkage or autarky taken as benchmarks) and hold irrespective of the strin-
gency of the common domestic abatement objective. In the following and without loss of 
generality we set e
0
= 1000 , 휔 = 900 and c
1
= 3c
2
= 0.3 , which gives 휏
1
= 3휏
2
= 30.
Border taxes on permit transfers Relative to full linkage, the implications of a bor-
der tax on permit imports in the admissible tax range 
[
0; 2∕3
]
 are displayed in Fig.  5. 
This also depicts the eﬀects of a quantitative transfer restriction when jurisdiction 1 
(A.19)Δ̂1 =
√
c1 −
√
c2
2
√
c1
a, and Δ̂2 = −
√
c1
c2
Δ̂1 =
√
c2 −
√
c1
2
√
c2
a.
(A.20)훾(휌̂) ≐ Δ̂1 − Δ̂2 = (휌̂ − 1)Δ1(휌̂) = a(
√
c
1
−
√
c
2
)2∕(2
√
c
1
c
2
).
(A.21)Δ̂ = Δ∗ − c2훾(휌̂)∕(c1 + c2).
(A.22)Δ̂1 − Δ̂ =
c2 − c1
2(c1 + c2)
a < 0, and |Δ̂2| − Δ̂ =
c2 − c1 − 3
√
c1c2
2
√
c1c2
a < 0.
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has monopsony power ( 휃 = 1 ). As the tax rate rises, Fig. 5a shows that trade decreases 
while the price wedge increases, i.e. cost eﬃciency decreases. In particular, 휇 = 0 cor-
responds to full linkage and for 휇 ≥ 2∕3 the tax regime replicates autarky. Figure  5b 
shows that jurisdiction 1’s surplus (gains from trade + tax revenues) is increasing with 휇 
as long as 휇 < 휇∗ ≃ .22 and at that 휇̄ ≃ .40 it is indiﬀerent between a tax 휇̄ and full link-
age. Both aggregate and jurisdiction 2’s surpluses decrease with the tax rate and remain 
positive. However, note that jurisdiction 2’s surplus is quasi linearly decreasing while 
the aggregate surplus is concave and relatively flat for small tax rates. For instance, 
when the tax rate is 휇 ≃ .3 jurisdiction 2 loses about half of its full-link gains while the 
deadweight loss remains small ( ∼ 10%).
Quantitative transfer restrictions Figure  6a depicts the optimal quantitative restric-
tions for jurisdiction 1 (black line) and 2 (grey line) as a function of relative bargaining 
power. The black and grey circles denote restrictions that constitute an improvement w.r.t. 
full linkage for jurisdictions 1 and 2, respectively. Note that the range of such quantity-
restricted linkages is wider for the lower-cost jurisdiction. Although both jurisdictions can-
not simultaneously be better oﬀ under a quantitative restriction w.r.t. full linkage, one juris-
diction may accept to lose out a share of its full-link gains if this is necessary for the other 
jurisdiction to initiate linking. As an illustration, the black circles in Fig. 6b indicate quan-
titative restrictions that are potentially acceptable in the sense that jurisdictions are willing 
to give up on (at most) half of their full-linkage gains in the restricted link. In this case, 
훼 ≃ .7 (resp. 훼 ≃ .3 ) is the most stringent limit to be potentially acceptable when 휃 = {0;1} 
(resp. 휃 = 휃̄).
Linkage with exchange rates We ﬁrst deﬁne three indexes measuring overall abate-
ment (B.1a), average abatement cost (B.1b) and cost efficiency (B.1c) relative to autarky. 
 The black curve in Fig. 4 plots ICE as a function of IA . Note that ICE merely gives an indi-
cation (and not a proper measure) of the degree of cost eﬃciency. The kink at 휌 = 1 is due 
to the max operator: at this point there is a discontinuity since the higher marginal abate-
ment cost jurisdiction switches ( ̄휏
1
≥ 휏̄
2
⇔ 휌 ≥ 1).
Figure 7 describes both the economic and environmental outcomes along the continuum 
of 휌-equilibria. The black curve in Fig. 7a shows that the degree of cost eﬃciency is the 
lower the farther away the exchange rate from parity, where it is maximal. The grey curve 
in Fig. 7a shows that overall abatement is higher than in the benchmark provided that the 
exchange rate lies in 
[
1; 휏1∕휏2
]
 and is maximal at 휌 = 휌̂ . Another way to see this is to con-
sider Fig.  7b. In the reduction zone, overall abatement is higher than in the benchmark 
since the volume of abatement undertaken in jurisdiction 2 is higher than the correspond-
ing increase in emissions occurring in jurisdiction 1 (the dotted grey line is above the con-
tinuous grey line and the spread between them is maximal at 휌 = 휌̂ ). The converse holds 
outside of this zone. Note also that as the exchange rate runs from autarky to parity both 
(B.1a)I
A =
2e
0
− (2휔 + (1 − 휌)Δ
1
(휌))
2(e
0
− 휔)
= 1 +
(휌 − 1)Δ
1
(휌)
2(e
0
− 휔)
(B.1b)I
AC =
1
IA
×
C
1
(e
0
− 휔 − Δ
1
(휌)) + C
2
(e
0
− 휔 + 휌Δ
1
(휌))
C
1
(e
0
− 휔) + C
2
(e
0
− 휔)
(B.1c)I
CE = ln
(
C
′
1
(e
0
− 휔)
C
′
2
(e
0
− 휔)
+ 1
)/
ln
(
max
i
C
′
i
(e
0
− 휔 − Δ
i
(휌))
min
i
C
′
i
(e
0
− 휔 − Δ
i
(휌))
+ 1
)
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abatement and permit flows from 2 to 1 increase. In the amplification zone the wedge in 
jurisdictional prices (relative to autarky) widens out as compared to full linkage while it 
is reversed in the inversion zone. In the latter zone, the negative values associated with the 
continuous and dotted grey lines indicate that permit trading occurs opposite to the natural 
direction.
Appendix 3: Cap Selection and Environmental Damages
We assume that damage functions are linear and let d
i
> 0 denote jurisdiction i’s con-
stant marginal damage from aggregate emissions. This ensures jurisdictional cap reac-
tion functions are orthogonal, i.e., jurisdictions select the same domestic cap whatever 
the other jurisdiction’s choice. Note that this is a mild assumption as there is evidence 
(a) (b)
Fig. 5  Effects of a border tax set by jurisdiction 1 on 2-permit imports
(b)(a)
Fig. 6  Jurisdictional preferences for quantitative linkage restrictions. a Thick black and grey lines are opti-
mal quantitative restrictions for jurisdiction 1 and 2, respectively, and intersect at 휃 = 휃̄ = .75 ; black and 
grey circles indicate volume-restricted linkages better than full linkage for jurisdiction 1 and 2, respectively. 
b Black (grey) bullets denote restrictions that are (not) potentially acceptable at a 50% level of full-linkage 
gains from trade by both jurisdictions
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that marginal benefits from mitigation are much flatter than marginal abatement costs 
over the range of annual emissions (Newell and Stavins 2003). We abstract from the 
strategic anticipatory effects of (different types of restricted) linkage on domestic cap 
selection à la Helm (2003). For instance, when cap selection is non-cooperative and 
linkage is not anticipated, the Cournot-Nash caps satisfy
Note that each domestic cap is strictly binding ( 휔
i
< e
0
 ) and independent of the cap-set-
ting decision in the other jurisdiction ( 휔−i) . We abstract from corners by assuming that 
d
i
< c
i
e
0
 , i.e., 휔
i
> 0 for i = {1, 2} . Note that our assumption of identical caps in the main 
text obtains if we assume that c
1
∕c
2
= d
1
∕d
2
 . Note also that jurisdictions do not internalize 
the negative externality generated by their emissions on the other jurisdiction. By contrast, 
cooperative caps are socially efficient and satisfy 휔∗
i
= e
0
− (d
i
+ d−i)∕ci < 휔i.
The optimal exchange rate 휌∗
i
 for jurisdiction i maximizes the difference in compli-
ance costs between autarky and 휌∗
i
-equilibrium, knowing how both jurisdictions react to 
a rate 휌 , that is
This mitigates jurisdictional preferences for unrealistically large/small rates as mentioned 
in the text. We do not provide an analytical solution to Programme (C.2) and refer the 
reader to the literature on optimal inter-temporal trading ratios, e.g., Leiby and Rubin 
(2001), Yates and Cronshaw (2001), Innes (2003) and Feng and Zhao (2006), for similar 
analytical problems.
Note that the socially efficient level of emissions 2e
0
− (d
1
+ d
2
)∕c need not coincide 
with that triggered under 휌̂-linkage. In particular, we numerically show that when d
i
∕c
i
 
is relatively small (resp. big) then the two jurisdictions overabate (resp. underabate) 
at the 휌̂-equilibrium as compared to the social optimum. Additionally, we numerically 
(C.1)휔i ≐ arg min
휔∈[0;e0]
⟨C
i
(e0 − 휔) + di(휔 + 휔−i)⟩ = e0 − di∕ci, for i = {1, 2}.
(C.2)휌
∗
i
≐ arg max
휌>0
⟨
C
i
(e0 − 휔) − Ci(e0 − 휔 − Δ̄i(휌)) + di(휌 − 1)Δ̄1(휌)
⟩
.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7  Relative implications of an exchange rate (with 휌̄ = 1 ). All values relative to autarky except transfers 
in b that are measured w.r.t. full linkage. Due to the abatement cost quadratic specification, jurisdictional 
abatements and prices have identical variations
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show that jurisdictionally-preferred exchange rates defined in Programme (C.2) that are 
potentially acceptable at a 50% level of full-link gains are centred around parity within 
the range [0.61; 1.44].
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